The balance between specific and ad valorem taxation by Michael Keen
Fiscal Studies (1998) vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1–37





A recurring issue in indirect tax design — most obviously, but not only, for goods traditionally
subject to heavy excises — is the appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem taxation.
Recent work has developed new perspectives on the issue, which is also one of the oldest in the
formal study of public finance. This paper provides a broadly non-technical account of the central
considerations that arise in choosing the balance between specific and ad valorem taxation,
reviewing and somewhat extending the lessons of theory and experience. There emerge clear
presumptions as to the relative effects of the two kinds of tax on such attributes as price, profits,
product quality and variety. But the socially optimal balance between them is likely to be quite
sensitive to the characteristics of the market at issue.
JEL classification: H21, H22.
I. INTRODUCTION
Discussions of indirect tax policy naturally focus primarily on the levels of these
taxes: on the effects of reducing VAT on domestic fuel and power, for example, or
the impact of cross-border shopping on the appropriate rate at which to tax beer.
In many markets, however — especially when the overall level of taxation is high
— the impact of indirect taxes may also be powerfully affected by their structure.
There are two main ways in which commodities are generally taxed: by a specific
(or ‘unit’) tax, charged as a fixed amount per unit of the product and so, in effect,
a tax on the volume of sales; and/or by an ad valorem tax, specified as a
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proportion of the product price and so, in effect, a tax on the value of sales. In
principle, there are many other ways in which one could envisage commodity taxes
being levied: one can conceive, for example, of taxes that bear differentially on
marginal and fixed costs of production (Konishi, Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura,
1990), or of attempting to discourage monopolistic pricing by a tax related only to
the unit price charged to consumers (Tam, 1991; Sumner, 1993). In practice,
however, specific and ad valorem taxes are generally seen as the main
possibilities.
This paper reviews the economic issues that arise in comparing ad valorem and
specific taxes. Our concern, it should be emphasised, is thus not with the level at
which some commodity is taxed, but solely with the balance between specific and
ad valorem components within this total. Some examples will illustrate the
potential importance of the issue:
· Since the 1970s, a central and contentious issue in the harmonisation of
tobacco taxes in the European Union has been precisely the balance between
specific and ad valorem components. The ratio of specific to total tax (on the
most popular price category of cigarette) is currently required to lie between 5
and 55 per cent. Most member states are indeed close to one or other extreme
of this range, and have proved reluctant to converge any further.
· Somewhat similar issues arise in connection with the harmonisation of taxes on
alcoholic drink. Policy in the Union is for the excise to be wholly specific
(though VAT, an ad valorem tax, is also levied). A number of recent and
potential entrants, however, levy ad valorem taxes, and the question then arises
as to the effects of the structural reform required by membership.
· One of the key issues that arose in designing the landfill tax introduced by the
UK government in 1996 was whether the tax should be specific — an amount
per tonne of waste — or ad valorem (HM Customs and Excise, 1995). The
initial proposal was that it be ad valorem, the final decision that it be specific.
· In many transition economies, the need for wholesale reform of previous
turnover tax systems has raised in stark form the question of whether excises
on cigarettes, tobacco and other highly taxed goods should be predominantly
specific or predominantly ad valorem.
The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxes is thus of continuing
policy relevance.
The comparison is also one of continuing intellectual interest. It is both one of
the oldest issues in the formal study of public finance and one in which recent
years have seen significant new developments. The first to recognise that the two
kinds of tax had potentially different effects was Cournot (1960), writing in the
1830s. His classic treatment of the monopoly case was then developed further by
Wicksell (1959), writing at the turn of the century, and by Suits and Musgrave
(1955). Increased understanding of and interest in forms of imperfect competitionSpecific and Ad Valorem Taxation
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and product differentiation have led to a revival of interest over the last 15 years
or so, and to a series of results that cast new light on the comparison between the
two forms of taxation. Much has been learnt, in particular, of their relative effects
both on the price that the consumer faces and on the quality and variety of the
taxed good that will be consumed. This in turn has enabled a more systematic
approach to the issue of optimal tax design, albeit one with few wholly clear-cut
general conclusions.
The purpose of this paper is to review, and somewhat extend, current
knowledge on the relative properties and merits of specific and ad valorem taxes.
1
This involves a series of positive questions: how do the two taxes differ in their
effects on such key quantities as prices, profits, tax revenue, product quality,
product variety and the distribution of real income? We focus too on the central
normative question of optimal tax design: what balance between the two kinds of
tax best serves the social good? In considering this, we shall at times differentiate
between the interests of three groups: consumers, who care about the price, quality
and variety of the product on offer; producers, who care about their profits; and
the government, which cares about tax revenue. This distinction is, of course,
rather artificial: it is consumers, for example, who ultimately receive all profits
2
and who benefit from the public expenditure financed by tax revenues, and
government is likely to care about the well-being of consumers. Nevertheless, it is
clear that individuals’ interests are not identical, and the distinction is useful in
understanding the directions in which these various concerns are likely to press.
The main body of the paper is in two parts. Section II reviews the central
theoretical considerations that arise in comparing specific and ad valorem taxes.
Section III turns to the lessons of practical experience, reviewing the (small)
econometric literature on the subject and outlining two recent reform episodes
involving a substantive shift in the tax structure, before finally turning to matters
of tax administration. Section IV concludes. Details of some novel theory and
empirics are given in two short appendices.
II. THEORY
The defining feature of a commodity tax is the creation of a wedge between the
consumer price of a product (the price, that is, that final purchasers actually pay)
and its producer price (the net price that the producer actually receives). The key
distinction between ad valorem and specific taxes is that they create this wedge in
different ways, and a good way to start comparing them is by exploring this
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distinction. To this end, denote by v the rate of ad valorem tax (expressed as a
proportion of the consumer price)
3 and by s the rate of specific taxation (specified,
of course, as some fixed amount per unit of the commodity). Then the producer
price of any good in which we might be interested, denoted by Pn (the subscript n
being a reminder that this is the price net of commodity taxes), is simply the
consumer price, P, less the specific tax, s, and ad valorem taxation, vP:
(1) . ) 1 ( s P v Pn - - º
The fundamentally different ways in which the two taxes are defined will prove
crucial. Specific taxation requires a precise definition of what it is that constitutes
‘one unit’ of the taxed good; ad valorem taxation does not. Thus a specific tax on
smoking tobacco may be levied as a fixed amount per kilogram of fine cut
tobacco, and a tax on beer as a fixed amount per hectolitre of beer of at least 12°
Plato. Specific taxes are thus, in effect, taxes on particular characteristics of
commodities: on the weight of tobacco or the volume of beer. But most goods are
naturally thought of as bundles of a potentially quite large number of
characteristics: packs of rolling tobacco of a given weight can vary, for instance,
in the smoothness and moisture of the tobacco, the airtightness of the seal and the
gaudiness of the packing; beer can vary in fizziness and in the pleasantness of the
pubs in which it is drunk; even as apparently homogeneous a product as petrol
differs in octane number, and the convenience and cleanliness of the locations in
which it is sold. The importance of this is that any specific tax is likely to leave
untaxed some characteristics of the good that are of importance to consumer
and/or producer; ad valorem taxation, in contrast, bears on all characteristics
whose value is reflected in the price charged to the consumer.
Returning to the identity in equation (1), one central policy conclusion is
immediate. In a world of perfect competition, and in which the nature of the
product being sold is immutable, the balance between ad valorem and specific
taxation is a matter of no significance. For the essence of perfect competition is
that firms perceive themselves to have so little market power that they take the
price at which they can sell their product as given, unaffected by their own
decisions. But if firms take P as fixed, then the ad valorem tax will simply be
perceived by them as a fixed amount, vP, to be paid per unit sold, exactly
equivalent to a specific tax of that amount. In the textbook model of perfect
competition, with price-taking firms selling a homogeneous product of fixed
quality — and leaving aside issues of uncertainty and administration (to which we
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turn in Sections II(3) and III(2) respectively)
4 — the balance between specific and
ad valorem taxation is of no importance.
But it is, of course, stretching credulity too far to imagine firms always being
so powerless, and in the rest of this section we address the considerations that
arise when either or both of these restrictions — price-taking behaviour and a
single fixed product quality — are relaxed. In doing so, it will help intuition to
draw on two key differences between the two kinds of tax that emerge on
considering the relationship in equation (1) more closely:
· Ad valorem taxation has a distinctive multiplier effect: since part of any
increase in the consumer price goes to the government as tax revenue, in order
to increase its net price by £1 a firm must increase the price charged to the
consumer by more than £1. More precisely, increasing the producer price by £1
requires increasing the consumer price by £1/(1 – v): if the ad valorem rate is
60 per cent, for example, increasing the producer price by £1 requires
increasing the consumer price by £2.50. Specific taxation, on the other hand,
has no such effect: the producer price rises one-for-one with the consumer
price.
The multiplier effect creates a clear disincentive for costly improvements in
product quality. To break even, a firm whose product is taxed at 60 per cent
must ask the consumer to pay £2.50 for a quality improvement that actually
costs only £1. There is thus good reason to suppose that predominantly ad
valorem taxation is likely to lead — all else being equal — to relatively low
product quality. This same multiplier effect will also affect, of course, the
impact of fixed costs of production, since these too will effectively be grossed
up by the ad valorem tax rate. And in so far as there are likely to be fixed (and
sunk) costs — of advertising, for example — associated with the operation of
distinct firms or the presence of distinct brands, so one would expect this
aspect of ad valorem taxation, exactly equivalent to an increase in such fixed
costs, to be associated with relatively low product variety and, perhaps, the
presence of relatively few firms.
Notice, moreover, that, by exactly the same token, the multiplier effect of
ad valorem taxation means that a £1 fall in the consumer price reduces the net
price received by the firm by less than £1: if the tax rate is 60 per cent, for
example, a £1 fall in P reduces the producer price by only 40p. In this sense,
ad valorem taxation is a public subsidy to price-cutting: part of the cost is
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borne by the government. Thus one might also expect ad valorem taxation to
correspond, other things equal, to a relatively low consumer price.
· Specific taxation has a distinct upgrading effect when variants of the good
differ in quality. As noted above, any specific tax is likely to leave untaxed
some elements in the bundle of characteristics that makes up the product: the
purity of the tobacco, for example, or the décor of the pubs. Increasing the
specific tax will then lead to a shift of consumption towards such untaxed
characteristics: lead, that is, to what is in effect an upgrading of the product,
with purer tobacco in stronger packaging, less sawdust on the pub floor and
pleasanter garage forecourts.
Such upgrading may reflect firms’ own decisions as to the characteristic
composition of their product: cigarette companies might choose, for example,
to provide stronger and brighter packaging. Or it may reflect the market
equilibrium in competition between brands of fixed quality. The first of these
mechanisms is clear enough, and will be explored in some depth below. To see
how upgrading might occur even when the quality of each product is fixed,
consider a simple case of vertical product differentiation: a high- and a low-
quality brand competing in a shared market, their prices being PH and PL
respectively, with PH > PL. Imposing on both a common specific tax will raise
the consumer price of each — by, let us assume, exactly the amount of the tax
— which will then have two effects. The first is an income effect: since the
price increases reduce the consumer’s real income, one would expect
consumption of both variants to fall.
5 Notice, however, that there is nothing
distinctive about specific taxation in this: an ad valorem tax that raised roughly
the same amount of tax revenue would reduce real income by roughly the same
amount. It is the second effect of a specific tax that gives rise to the distinctive
feature of upgrading. For since (PH + s)/(PL + s) < PH/PL, introducing a specific
tax will cause the relative price of the high-quality brand to fall. (An ad
valorem tax, of course, would leave this relative price unchanged.) Thus while
both brands might suffer a reduction in the level of sales, one would expect this
shift of relative price to lead to a substitution toward — and so an increase in
the market share of — the higher-quality brand.
These two effects — multiplier and upgrading — are at the heart of much of
what follows. But although highly suggestive as to the likely effects and merits of
the two kinds of taxation, they do not in themselves enable one to answer any of
the policy questions raised at the outset. How, for example, is one to weigh the
tendency for a relatively high ratio of specific to ad valorem taxation to lead to a
relatively high consumer price against its tendency also to sustain relatively high
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levels of product quality and variety? Which of the two taxes is likely to be most
effective in raising revenue? Are there any cases in which consumers, government
and firms could all agree on the type of tax to be preferred? To address these and
other issues, the rest of this section considers the implications of a series of
features that create a real distinction between ad valorem and specific taxation.
1. Imperfect Competition when All Goods are Identical
Suppose then that we leave the world of perfect competition, entering instead one
in which firms perceive that the consumer price at which they can sell their
product — and, importantly, we assume throughout this section that they all sell
the same good, whose quality is immutable — depends to some degree on the
amount that they sell. Under an ad valorem tax, they will then perceive the tax per
unit, vP, also to depend on the numbers of units sold; under a specific tax, s, in
contrast, it does not. One would thus expect, and indeed we shall shortly verify,
that the two taxes will have different effects. Which is socially preferable?
Note first that imperfect competition in itself immediately creates a purely
corrective role for commodity taxation (or, more precisely, subsidisation). For —
in the absence of external effects of the kind discussed in Section II(4) below —
profit maximisation will then typically lead to output levels below the ‘first-best’
efficient level at which consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for the good, as
measured by the consumer price, P, is equated to the marginal cost to society of its
production, MC. If the government is able to finance any deficit by lump-sum
taxes (taxes, that is, that do not distort economic decisions at the margin), then it
would be appropriate for it to induce an expansion of output to the first-best level
by providing a sufficiently large output subsidy. And for this purpose it makes no
difference which instrument is used: ad valorem or specific subsidies (or a
combination of the two) would do equally well.
The more relevant case for our purposes is that in which the government does
not have unrestricted ability to levy optimal lump-sum taxes — otherwise tax
design would be a trivial matter — and so must deploy commodity taxation simply
to raise revenue. The question then is how it can best design the tax system so as
to raise the revenue required to finance public expenditure whilst doing least harm
to consumer welfare, bearing in mind that consumers are also the ultimate
recipients of any profits that firms earn. It will prove useful, too, to defer
consideration of the distinct issues raised by differences in taste or income across
consumers by assuming them, for the present, to be identical with one another.
This then leads to a variant of what is known as the Ramsey problem, which we
shall encounter in various contexts as the discussion proceeds: how should a
government that needs to raise some fixed amount of tax revenue, and which seeks
to maximise consumer welfare, set specific and ad valorem taxes if those are the
only instruments available to it? Under perfect competition, it is clear, the balance
between the two is irrelevant. Under imperfect competition, in contrast, thereFiscal Studies
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emerges — so long as the (strong) assumption of a homogeneous product is
retained — a quite clear preference for one over the other.
(a) Monopoly
Consider first the extreme form of imperfection in which there is a single
monopoly producer.
6 Imagine we begin in a situation in which only a specific tax
is imposed, at rate s0. Equating marginal revenue net of tax to marginal cost, MC,
the profit-maximising monopolist will produce at a level of output (and
corresponding consumer price, P0) at which MR – s0 = MC, where MR denotes
marginal revenue before any commodity tax is paid. Now consider the effects of
replacing this specific tax by an ad valorem tax set at a level v0 such that total tax
would remain unchanged if the consumer price (and hence also total demand) did
not change: that is, such that v0P0 = s0. Net marginal revenue under this ad
valorem tax is then (1 – v0)MR = MR – s0 (MR/P), and, since MR < P (because the
demand curve, we naturally assume, is downward-sloping), it must be that (1 –
v0)MR > MR – s0: that is, the shift to this ad valorem tax causes net marginal
revenue at the initial output level to rise. And with net marginal revenue
consequently now exceeding marginal cost at the initial output level, the profit-
maximising firm will expand output in response to this tax shift, and the consumer
price will consequently fall. Hence:
· Consumers gain from a shift towards wholly ad valorem taxation.
· The monopolist also benefits from the shift to ad valorem taxation. To see this,
notice that the construction of v0 is such that the monopolist could keep profits
unchanged simply by holding output and the consumer price at their initial
levels. Thus the fact that the monopolist finds it even more advantageous to
change output means that profits must actually increase.
· Tax revenue also increases on moving to ad valorem taxation. This follows
from two observations: that (again by the construction of v0) tax revenue would
have been unchanged had output remained at its initial level; and that the
expansion of output shown above must increase revenue from the ad valorem
tax, v0. The reason for this latter feature is that (assuming marginal cost to be
strictly positive) a monopolist will only produce at a point where the elasticity
of demand exceeds one, implying that the reduction in the consumer price will
lead to increased consumer expenditure and hence — since taxation is now
wholly ad valorem — to increased tax revenue.
The conclusion — due to Skeath and Trandel (1994) — is thus strikingly
unambiguous: with monopoly provision of a single good of fixed quality,
consumers prefer ad valorem taxation because it leads to a lower price, firms
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prefer it because it leads to higher profits and government prefers it because it
leads to higher revenue.
7 There is no need to trade off the interests of these three
groups: ad valorem taxation dominates specific.
(b) Cournot Oligopoly
It is natural to wonder whether this dominance result continues to hold in
circumstances less extreme than pure monopoly. Thus we now relax the
assumption that there is only one actual and potential firm, but retain for the
moment the assumption that the product itself is of a single fixed quality. This
latter assumption is clearly an unappealing one in the context of many heavily
taxed commodities — it immediately precludes, for example, the upgrading effect
noted above — and we shall see in Section II(2) that relaxing it has profound
implications for the optimal tax structure. For the present, however, we consider a
standard model of Cournot oligopoly, in which a fixed number of identical
8 firms
sell a homogeneous good,
9 each taking as given when making its own output
decision the output choices of all the others.
10 Industry output will then be lower
than if all firms behaved competitively but greater than if they colluded to act as a
single monopolist. This latter point reflects an externality operating between the
firms that will prove important to our concerns: each firm recognises that the fall
in price induced by an expansion of its own output will reduce its own revenues,
but takes no account of the similar harm done to the profits of other firms. In
pursuing their own self-interest, firms are thus led to produce more than is in their
collective best interest.
Consider first the relative effects of the two taxes on the consumer price. One
can certainly show — by a slight variant of the preceding argument — that for
any wholly specific tax system, there exists a wholly ad valorem one that leads to
a lower price and increased tax revenue.
11 In this sense, predominantly ad valorem
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 > 0.Fiscal Studies
10
taxation again corresponds to a relatively low price, as in the monopoly case. This
bears on one distinctive implication of imperfect competition in which there has
been much interest. Under perfect competition, the consumer price can never rise
by more than the amount of any tax increase. Under imperfect competition, in
contrast, taxes may be ‘over-shifted’: that is, the price to the consumer may
(depending on the elasticity of the elasticity of demand) rise by more than the
amount of the tax (Stern, 1987). One (testable) implication of this result on the
relative price effects of the two kinds of tax is thus that while either may be over-
shifted, this is more likely to happen with specific taxation than with ad valorem.
12
The comparative effects of the two taxes on the consumer price are thus
broadly the same as under monopoly. Now, however, one cannot go on from this
to conclude that ad valorem taxation dominates specific. For there is no longer
any guarantee that shifting to ad valorem taxation will increase profits. Certainly,
the same argument as before implies that each firm expects to increase its profits
by expanding output in response to the shift to ad valorem taxation; but now the
externality at work between them means that what each perceives to be
advantageous given the behaviour of others may be collectively harmful, given
that all are behaving in the same way.
Indeed, Delipalla and Keen (1992) show that in the Cournot context there is a
real sense in which profits are higher under specific than under ad valorem
taxation. More precisely, imagine that a specific tax is initially in place, and
consider the effects of a ‘small’ shift towards ad valorem taxation so constructed
that total tax payable remains unchanged at the initial price. By exactly the same
argument as for the monopoly case above — except that here the change is
infinitely small — this will induce each firm to slightly expand its output. Since
each firm is initially choosing its output so as to maximise its own profit, each
firm’s expansion of its own output will have only a tiny effect on its own profits.
But, as noted above, each firm has an adverse external effect on the others when it
expands its output, so that when all expand their output together, each will suffer
a harm from the output expansion of the other firms.
13 Thus the shift towards ad
valorem taxation reduces profits.
In the Cournot case, there is thus a clear conflict of interest: consumers prefer
ad valorem taxation in their role as consumers of both the taxed good and public
expenditure, but prefer specific taxation in their role as producers. Quite where the
public interest lies will then depend on the relative social weights attached to
consumer surplus and to profits. For the bench-mark case in which the two are
weighted equally, the advantage lies with ad valorem taxation. This is established
by Delipalla and Keen (1992), who consider the Ramsey problem for the Cournot
oligopoly case — with profits accruing to the representative consumer — but
constrained too (for no particular reason other than analytical ease) by the
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requirement that both tax rates be non-negative. The optimal specific tax, they
show, is zero: any revenue needed is best raised by ad valorem taxation. This
result is extended by Myles (1994), who removes the restriction to non-negative
taxes and shows that — under somewhat tighter conditions — it is then possible to
raise any tax revenue required and entirely eliminate the welfare loss from




Suppose now that the number of firms is not fixed but instead determined
endogenously by the condition that firms enter or exit the industry until profits are
zero. The analytics of this case follow straightforwardly from those of Cournot
oligopoly just described, for what leads when the number of firms is fixed to an
increase in profits will now lead instead to an inflow of new firms. Thus a shift
away from ad valorem taxation and towards specific — which we have seen
would lead to an increase in profits if the number of firms were held constant —
will instead attract new entry and so lead to an increase in the number of firms
active in equilibrium.
Looking at the Ramsey problem, the question then becomes that of whether in
terms of the social good there tends, in the absence of taxation, to be too few firms
in equilibrium or too many. On the one hand, an increase in the number of firms
has the beneficial effect of intensifying competition; on the other, it has the
harmful effect of multiplying the number of times that the fixed costs associated
with the existence of a distinct firm are incurred. The Cournot model turns out to
have the feature that entry tends to be excessive:
15 and Ramsey taxation again calls
for wholly ad valorem taxation, now as a means of checking this excess.
2. Product Quality and Variety
The analyses discussed above rely heavily on the assumption that all firms
produce exactly the same good and, moreover, that the quality of that good is
unchangeable. In practice, the effects of the tax structure on the nature of the
product offered in equilibrium are often a major concern in framing the balance
between specific and ad valorem taxes. In the context of the major excises,
especially, it is clear that the markets for alcoholic drink and tobacco products are
characterised by very strong branding and extremely marked product
differentiation. To deal with these key features of such markets, we now shift the
focus to the analysis of the impact of tax structure on product quality and variety.
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(a) Quality
For simplicity, we focus mainly on a simple model in which product quality — by
which we mean, as discussed above, quality measured in terms of some untaxed
attribute — is determined endogenously by profit-maximising firms but (in order
to abstract from imperfections of competition of the kind just analysed) a high
degree of competitiveness is retained by supposing that firms take as given not the
price at which they can sell their product but rather the level of utility that
consumers require if they are to find the combination of price and quality offered
by the firm acceptable. Firms thus choose both the price, P, at which they sell their
product and its quality, q, but subject to the condition that the associated level of
utility enjoyed by the consumer, V(P,q), must equal or exceed some reservation
level; and entry or exit occurs until, in equilibrium, each firm also breaks exactly
even. There are assumed to be no fixed costs, so that, in equilibrium, price equals
marginal cost.
Our interest centres around the condition characterising the profit-maximising
choice of quality. This is that the marginal cost of raising the quality of any given
level of output, MQ, equals the additional amount, net of taxes, that the consumer
can be made to pay for that increase in the quality of each unit. This latter is given
by (1 – v)MWP, where MWP denotes the consumer’s gross marginal willingness
to pay for an improvement in quality,
16 so that equilibrium requires
(2) MQ MWP v = - ) 1 (
where we shall assume, for simplicity, that MQ is independent of the level of
quality
17 and simply proportional to the level of output. (Note that the specific tax,
s, does not enter explicitly into equation (2), the reason being that a change in
quality does not affect the tax payable per unit of the good.) Consider, then, the
likely effects on product quality of the two kinds of tax:
· An increase in the ad valorem tax, v, will call for an increase in MWP in order
to preserve the equality in equation (2); and since one would typically expect
the marginal willingness to pay for quality to fall as quality improves, one
would typically expect a higher ad valorem tax to lead to a reduction in
product quality. This is simply another manifestation, of course, of the
multiplier effect discussed earlier.
There is, though, an important bench-mark case in which quality is
unaffected by ad valorem taxation. This is that of a good whose only
characteristic of interest to the consumer is the number of units of some service
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it delivers. The archetypal example here is the light bulb: all that matters to the
consumer is the number of hours of lighting enjoyed, not (we assume) how
many times the light bulb must be changed to ensure that flow of lighting.
Interpreting now q as number of lit hours provided by a bulb, the consumer
thus cares only about the effective price of one hour of lighting, which is
simply P/q. Thus the firm can proceed by simply setting quality at whichever
level (q*, say) minimises the cost of producing an hour of lighting, and then
deciding on the effective price, P/q*, to charge for each such hour. Changing
the ad valorem tax will then have no effect on the cost-minimising quality
choice, q*, but will simply change the price per light bulb, P.
· Although the specific tax, s, does not enter the condition (2) directly, it can
have a powerful indirect effect: it affects the consumer price, P, which in turn
will generally affect MWP. More precisely, one might expect consumers to be
willing to pay more for an improvement in the quality of a good the higher is its
unit price: there is no law decreeing that this must be the case, but intuition
suggests that in so far as a high price leads to consumption of relatively few
units of a good, so the quality of each such unit becomes more important to the
consumer, quality to some degree compensating for quantity. If then MWP
increases with P, specific taxation is likely to induce an increase in MWP that
calls for an increase in quality to restore the equality in equation (2). Specific
taxation, that is, will tend to be associated with relatively high product quality.
This is especially evident in the light-bulb case: a specific tax s per light bulb
implies a tax of s/q per hour of lighting that each bulb provides, which will
clearly encourage an increase in durability. These observations, in turn, are
essentially just a further articulation of the upgrading effect discussed more
loosely above.
There is, though, one important bench-mark case in which quality is
unaffected by specific taxation. This is the ‘full-price’ case, in which
consumers care about the sum of the producer price and some function of
quality: care, that is, only about P – h(q), for some decreasing function h(.).
Reducing the check-in time for an air journey, for example, or increasing the
frequency of a rail service, conveys benefits that are likely to depend on the
value attached to time savings rather than on the price of the ticket itself. In
such a case, MWP is independent of price — business people are willing to pay
the same amount for a reduced check-in time irrespective of the fare they pay
— and the channel whereby specific taxation may affect quality just identified
is thus closed: in the full-price case, quality is independent of the level of
specific taxation (but, as is easily checked, is reduced by ad valorem taxation).
The two kinds of tax are thus likely to have very different effects on product
quality. These differences in turn point to the likelihood of different effects on the
consumer price. Increasing a specific tax will generally lead to an increase in
quality that may plausibly result in the consumer price rising by more than theFiscal Studies
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amount of tax paid: that is, the expectation is that a specific tax will be over-
shifted. Increasing an ad valorem tax, in contrast, typically leads to quality
degradation that may well lead to the consumer price rising by less than the
amount of the tax. These qualitative implications are exactly the same, of course,
as those that emerged from the earlier analysis of homogeneous product oligopoly.
But the ‘over-shifting’ here, it should be emphasised, is of a quite different kind
from that which may arise under Cournot oligopoly: here, it is entirely a reflection
of an upgrading of product quality. By the same token, of course, the implication
is that a finding that specific taxes are over-shifted in practice does not indicate
non-competitive behaviour; it may instead signal a tendency to induce quality
improvement.
Which form of taxation then is to be preferred? More precisely, what is the
balance between specific and ad valorem taxation required to solve, in the present
model of endogenous quality, the Ramsey problem of maximising consumer
welfare subject to the constraint of raising some given amount of tax revenue?
Strikingly, it turns out that the optimal tax structure has the feature that, to a
first approximation, it should leave the equilibrium level of quality the same as it
would be in the absence of any tax.
18 This surprisingly stark result stems, it seems,
from the absence from this model of any corrective role for taxation: distorting the
level of quality aschieves no useful object in raising revenue or bolstering
consumer welfare.
19 This result in turn implies that the solutions to the Ramsey
problem take simple and contrasting forms in the special bench-mark cases
identified above: in the light-bulb case (quality unaffected by ad valorem
taxation), ad valorem taxation is indeed fully optimal; conversely, in the full-price
case (quality unaffected by specific taxation), wholly specific taxation is optimal.
The light-bulb and full-price cases are naturally thought of as polar extremes,
20
and for intermediate cases some mixture between the two taxes will be
appropriate. That optimal mix turns out to have a very simple form: Delipalla and
Keen (1996) show
21 that the optimal ratio of ad valorem to total taxation —
exactly the quantity, interestingly, that is the subject of current harmonisation
restrictions in the EU — is simply the price elasticity of the MWP, which we shall
                                                                                                                             
18More precisely, the optimum has the feature that quality is unaffected by a small intensification of v and s.
Though not noted by them, this follows from the analysis in Delipalla and Keen (1996): from their equation (3), the
effect on equilibrium quality of a reform (dv, ds) = a (v,s) that changes both specific and ad valorem taxes by the
same (small) proportion a  is proportional to q (vP+s) – vP, where  P V V P q ¶ - ¶ º / ) / ln( q  is the price elasticity of
MWP; but their central result, discussed shortly, is that vP/(vP+s) = q  at an optimum.
19Note that the result is nevertheless consistent with the usual second-best presumption that if one margin of choice
must be distorted — as pricing decisions must be here in order to raise revenue — so too should others: for the rule
(2) associated with quality choice typically is affected by the optimal tax system. The point rather is that the impact
of this on q is offset by the consequences of the tax effects on P.
20They do not, however, bound all possibilities: one can conceive of still more extreme circumstances, in which
optimal policy will require either an ad valorem or a specific subsidy.
21This is for the case in which the marginal utility of income is constant.Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation
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denote by q  and assume (as we did above) to be positive. For it is q  that governs
the impact of the two taxes on quality. Consider, for example, the effects of
increasing s. If quality were to remain at its initial level, price would rise by the
full amount of the tax. If q  is large, this price increase would lead to a large
increase in MWP; all else being equal, a large increase in quality would then be
needed to restore the equality in equation (2). Reasoning similarly for an increase
in v, if q  is large then the large induced increase in MWP will go a long way
towards offsetting the reduction in 1–v that is a direct consequence of the tax
increase, leaving only a relatively small reduction in the net marginal willingness
to pay, (1–v)MWP, on the left-hand side of equation (2); and thus only a small
reduction in quality will be needed to restore the equality. Recalling that the
optimal tax structure leaves quality (approximately) unchanged, the trick —
loosely speaking — is to combine quality-reducing ad valorem taxation with
quality-increasing specific taxation in such a way that their effects on quality
cancel out but the requisite amount of revenue is raised. This will generally require
relatively heavy reliance on whichever tax has least effect on quality: when q  is
large, for instance, since (as we have just seen) it is ad valorem taxation that has
relatively little effect on quality, so it is ad valorem taxation that should be used
relatively heavily. The light-bulb and full-price cases are merely the special cases
of this more general result and intuition in which q  happens to take the extreme
values 1 and 0 respectively.
(b) Variety
The discussion so far has been of a model in which only one variant of the product
is offered in equilibrium, with attention focused on the quality of that single good.
But most markets are characterised by some variety in the product on offer, and it
is to this that we now briefly turn.
Consider first the balance between specific and ad valorem taxation in a simple
model of horizontal product differentiation: differentiation, that is, such that there
is no agreed ranking of products by consumers, but merely differences in taste as
between, say, red cars and blue. The key consideration that emerges is the
multiplier effect of ad valorem taxation on fixed costs: this implies, as discussed
at the outset, that ad valorem taxation tends to reduce variety. The implications of
this for commodity tax design depend on whether or not variety tends, in the
absence of taxation, to be excessive: in a simple model of this kind
22 considered by
Kay and Keen (1983), it is, and the optimal rate of ad valorem taxation is
consequently high; indeed, they show that the ad valorem tax is optimally set so as
to induce the appropriate level of variety and the specific tax — which is
effectively a lump-sum tax in this model, since all consumers are assumed always
to buy exactly one unit of the good — then set so as to raise any further revenue
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required (which may conceivably mean a specific subsidy, set so as to return to the
consumer any excess of proceeds from the corrective ad valorem tax over the
revenue needed for public expenditure).
A rather different view of horizontal differentiation is embodied in the popular
model of monopolistic competition of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In this
formulation, consumers do not have a preferred type of the product in question but
rather derive some benefit from a diversity of available choice; consequently,
competition between firms is not localised with each competing most directly with
others offering products of a similar type (as is the case in the model used by Kay
and Keen (1983)) but rather is generalised. The appropriate balance between
specific and ad valorem taxes in this model is explored in Appendix A of this
paper. It is shown there that the key consideration is the importance consumers
attach to diversity:
23 in particular, the sign of the optimal specific tax is
independent of the revenue requirement and depends only on the strength of
consumers’ preference for diversity. When this is relatively low, the solution to the
Ramsey problem involves a specific subsidy financed by a high ad valorem tax
(which must also, of course, raise the tax revenue required): intuitively, it is then
optimal to aim for relatively little variety but a high level of output of each variant
(enabling the enjoyment of scale economies). If, on the other hand, the taste for
diversity is strong, then optimal policy involves a positive specific tax, with the
optimal ad valorem tax tending to zero as the taste for diversity becomes infinitely
strong.
Tax effects in a model of vertical product differentiation — circumstances, that
is, in which all agree that some variant is better than others — are considered by
Cremer and Thisse (1994). They show that ad valorem taxation may then not
merely be under-shifted (as it generally is in the model of variable quality in
subsection (a) above) but may even lead to such a large reduction in quality, and
such an intensification of price competition, that the consumer prices of the
differentiated goods actually fall. Reflecting this, optimal policy
24 involves an ad
valorem tax used to finance a specific subsidy (specific taxation being, for the
same reason as in Kay and Keen (1983), lump-sum in this model). Interestingly,
this is exactly as in the analysis of Kay and and Keen (1983) discussed above,
though the nature of product differentiation is very different.
25
Different forms of product variety thus give rise to somewhat varying
conclusions. Behind the differences of detail, however, a common theme emerges:
                                                                                                                             
23A qualitatively similar conclusion is reached, in a different model of product differentiation, by Anderson, de
Palma and Kreider (1997).
24The objective function is the simple sum of utilities, with individuals differing in the strength of their taste for the
differentiated good.
25A rather different conclusion is reached by Anderson, de Palma and Kreider (1997), who examine a model of
vertical product differentiation in which product qualities are fixed. They find that specific taxation is more efficient
if (inter alia) the cost difference between the variants is small: for then it is especially desirable to counteract the
tendency to under-provision of the high-quality good by narrowing the relative differential in consumer prices.Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation
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other things being equal, predominantly specific taxation is more likely to be
desirable the greater are the net benefits society derives from product variety.
3. The Level, Certainty and Stability of Tax Revenues
Governments will naturally take a close interest in the implications of the balance
between specific and ad valorem taxes for the tax revenues they receive.
Reflecting this, a number of papers have considered the optimal balance between
the two types of tax when the sole object of policy is to maximise tax revenue: see
Bohanon and van Cott (1984 and 1991) and Kay and Keen (1987a and 1991).
Interestingly, the qualitative features of the tax structure required to maximise
revenue are very often essentially the same as those of that required for the
Ramsey problem of maximising consumer welfare subject to a revenue constraint.
For example, it follows from the results of Kay and Keen (1991) that the ratio of
ad valorem to total taxation required to maximise revenue in the model of variable
quality in Section II(2)(a) is exactly the same as that required to maximise
consumer welfare subject to a revenue constraint: intuitively, the goal of revenue
maximisation also creates no need to distort quality, so that the key result at the
end of Section II(2)(a) — that, at the optimum, quality is unaffected by a small
intensification of the tax system — applies in a context of revenue maximisation
too. Hence so too does the result that the optimal ratio of ad valorem to total
taxation is exactly q . Of course, the optimal levels of the two taxes will naturally
differ between the case in which the object of policy is to maximise welfare subject
to a revenue requirement and that in which it is to maximise revenue; but the
balance between them does not. Given this close qualitative similarity of optimal
tax structures, and for the sake of brevity, we need consider the implications of the
tax mix for the level of revenues no further.
Instead, we focus here on a distinct set of revenue concerns: the predictability,
certainty and stability of tax revenues.
26 Such concerns are currently especially
evident in many transition economies, which have faced the difficult problem of
attempting fundamental reforms of their tax systems at the same time as needing to
secure their revenue bases to maintain macroeconomic and perhaps also political
stability. Excises are such a central part of the overall revenue picture in such
countries that the certainty of their revenue yield has been a major concern in
choosing between specific and ad valorem taxation: this has certainly been the
case, for example, in Georgia and the Ukraine. Part of the certainty issue here
relates to enforcement questions that we take up in Section III. Here, we focus
instead on the potential uncertainty of taxes legally payable.
                                                                                                                             
26Another way in which uncertainty might affect the choice between specific and ad valorem taxation is raised and
explored by Fraser (1985), apparently with small-scale agricultural producers in mind: since the two taxes have
quite different risk-sharing properties — under an ad valorem tax, but not under a specific, for instance, price
uncertainty is in part borne by the government — they will not be equivalent from the perspective of a risk-averse
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Such uncertainty might arise from a variety of sources and take a variety of
forms. One central case is that in which, for reasons not modelled, the consumer
price of the taxed good is uncertain. This might arise from stochastic variation in
the price of some central input — we might be considering, for example, the
potential revenue effects of an oil price shock — or just reflect uncertainty as to
the behaviour of the industry; the deep source of the randomness need not concern
us. We simply take it that while the aggregate demand function X(.) is non-
stochastic (and downward-sloping), its argument, P, is. Tax revenue,
(vP + s)X(P), then becomes random, and the question we ask is: in the face of such
price uncertainty, how should the balance between ad valorem and specific taxes
be set so as to minimise the variation in tax revenues?
It is clear that the price elasticity of demand, E, (defined to be non-negative)
has a crucial role to play here. Suppose first that E = 0, so that aggregate sales, X,
are unaffected by the price level. Clearly then all variation in revenue can be
removed by using only specific taxes. If, on the other hand, E = 1, then consumer
expenditure, PX, is independent of P and so all variation in revenues is eliminated
by using only ad valorem taxation. Indeed, it is easily shown
27 that revenue from
the taxed good is entirely unaffected by small changes in its consumer price — and







so that the share of ad valorem in total taxation is equal to the price elasticity of
demand. Notice, moreover, that this condition does not restrict the overall level of
taxation, only its composition. By choosing an appropriate mixture of specific and
ad valorem taxes,
29 one can thus secure complete certainty of revenues at no cost
in terms of the total revenue raised.
This rule invites illustrative calculations. Taking cigarettes, for example, Fry
and Pashardes (1988) put the own-price elasticity of demand at around 0.5 for the
UK, while Barnett, Keeler and Hu (1995) estimate it to be around 0.7 in the US.
Such figures imply that a rough balance between specific and ad valorem
components, with perhaps some leaning towards ad valorem, would best stabilise
revenues.
Though neat, the rule in equation (3) is, of course, highly stylised. Two
limitations deserve particular emphasis. The first is that it assumes the form of the
demand function to be known: Kay and Keen (1982) show that stability of
expected tax revenue in the face of uncertainty concerning the true value of the
elasticity E requires a ratio of ad valorem to total taxation below the expected
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28The first statement of this result seems to be that in Tobacco Advisory Council (1980).
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value of the elasticity. Second, it neglects the impact that changes in the price of
the good in question have on expenditure on other taxed goods: a change in the
price of cigarettes will typically affect, for example, expenditure on, and hence tax
revenue from, alcoholic drinks. The strength and direction of this effect depend on
the rates at which other goods are taxed and the magnitude and sign of cross-price
effects between the two sets of goods: if expenditure switches to untaxed
contraband, for example, then of course equation (3) continues to apply. To get
some feel for the possible importance of cross effects more generally, consider the
case in which total expenditure is fixed. Whether the rule in equation (3) leads to
too little or too much reliance on ad valorem taxation then depends on whether E
is (respectively) less or greater than unity:
30 intuitively, if it is less, then an
increase in P reduces expenditure on the other good and it becomes more
important to extract revenue from the increased expenditure on the good in
question through a relatively high ad valorem component. Suppose, for example,
that E = 0.5, that the rate of tax applied to other goods is 15 per cent and that tax
on the good of interest is 75 per cent of its consumer price. Constancy of overall
tax revenue then requires a ratio of ad valorem to total tax of not 50 per cent, as
equation (3) would imply, but 60 per cent.
4. Externalities
External effects from consumption or production — effects, that is, borne by
people other than those doing the consuming or producing — have long loomed
large in the design (at least, the rhetoric of the design) of the major excises: those
on alcoholic drink, tobacco products and hydrocarbons. More recently, of course,
the growing interest in environmental taxes has lent further urgency to issues of
appropriate tax design in the presence of externalities.
To a very large degree, the central issues raised by external effects concern the
level of taxation, not — our concern here — its structure. There are, however,
some direct implications for the appropriate roles of specific and ad valorem
taxation.
The most fundamental is a straightforward application of a widely used general
principle for the optimal targeting of policy instruments: to avoid unintended
distortions on other margins of choice, the best instrument for correcting
behaviour deemed inappropriate is the one that affects that behaviour most directly
and exclusively.
31 For since most externalities can be traced to some particular
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31This is a general principle, not a universal truth: there may be circumstances in which instruments other than those
most directly related to the distortion have a role. In the environmental context, this may be the case, for example,Fiscal Studies
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characteristic of the good in question, the best response is likely to be a specific
tax on that characteristic. In this important sense, externalities inherently point to
specific rather than ad valorem taxation.
32
Suppose, for example, that the external damage (or, perhaps, benefit) from
drinking comes simply from drunkenness. Then one would expect the wisest policy
response to be to tax drinks on the basis of their alcohol content, not on their
value. Ad valorem taxation would discourage drinking in general — including
harmless thirst-quenching — rather than inebriation in particular, and lead too to
unnecessary deterioration of such characteristics as pub quality. Indeed, the
general point here — that externalities inherently favour appropriate specific
taxation — is already, in practice, a familiar one: awareness that the external
damage of burning petrol increases with its lead content, for example, led to
differentiation of the tax rate by that lead content.
The power of this point is also indicated by recent analyses of optimal
environmental taxation under imperfect competition. Suppose that consumers
suffer harm from the total of their consumption of some good, though each is so
small that he or she takes no account of this in deciding his or her own
consumption: the good might be the use of carbon fuels, for example, and the harm
global warming. What is the appropriate policy response? If there is perfect
competition, the answer is simple: consumption should be taxed, and it does not
matter — for reasons noted at the outset above — whether that tax is specific or
ad valorem: that equivalence does not contradict the presumption developed above
concerning optimal targeting but simply reflects the very special feature of perfect
competition that the two instruments are then equivalent. But now suppose the
industry is organised as a Cournot oligopoly, of the kind discussed in Section
II(1)(b). In this case, there are two distortions, and they point in opposite
directions: the externality still points to output being too high in terms of the broad
public interest, but the oligopolistic output restriction that we concentrated on
earlier suggests that output will be too low. Not surprisingly, the nature of the
solution to the Ramsey problem now depends on whether the externality is ‘small’
or ‘large’. If small enough, then the solution is exactly as if the externality did not
exist, and consequently — as an application of the results referred to above —
wholly ad valorem taxation is optimal. But Pirttilä (1997) shows that once the
                                                                                                                             
when individuals are heterogeneous and the optimal corrective tax is consequently differentiated across individuals:
if person-specific taxes are for some reason impossible, indirect instruments — taxes or subsidies on goods other
than the one that generates the externality — may be optimal: see the discussion in Myles (1995). We have in mind
in this subsection the case in which individuals are identical, leaving to future work the interesting question of
whether heterogeneity and the potential case for indirect instruments affect the optimal balance between specific and
ad valorem taxation on the externality-generating activity itself.
32Matters become more complicated if the relevant market is vulnerable to exogenous shocks, but with no clear
implications for the choice of instrument: it is a merit (respectively, weakness) of ad valorem taxation, for example,
that the expansion of output induced by an unexpected shift of the demand (supply) curve is accompanied by an
increase (reduction) in the tax wedge vP that mitigates (worsens) any adverse external effect of that expansion. See
Dickie and Trandel (1996).Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation
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externality is large enough to have any effect on policy, the optimal tax structure
switches immediately to the opposite extreme: wholly specific taxation is optimal.
That is, either the externality makes no difference or — consistent with the general
case for specific taxes argued above (the externality in this analysis, recall, being
assumed related to the level of output, exactly the base of the specific tax) — it
points to wholly specific taxation.
5. Distributional Considerations
The discussion so far has effectively assumed all consumers to be identical, and so
has abstracted from the possibility that the balance between specific and ad
valorem taxation might have systematic effects on the distribution of economic
welfare across the population. This neglect is indeed a feature of the literature in
this area. Doubtless this is in large part because the distributional effect of
commodity taxes seems likely to be determined primarily by their levels rather
than their structure, and because other better-targeted devices — most obviously
income tax and social security benefits — are available in developed countries to
tailor distributional effects more precisely. Nevertheless, the potentially distinct
distributional consequences of the two merit some attention as a neglected aspect
of tax incidence, and one that may be of some importance in developing and
transitional economies.
Progressivity is most obviously a potential concern in choosing the balance
between specific and ad valorem components if the ‘rich’ choose to consume a
better variant of the product than do the ‘poor’. A simple model of this kind, with
vertical product differentiation driven by differences in income,
33 is considered in
Kay and Keen (1987b): there, rich and poor never switch between the two goods
and the quality of that consumed by the rich is determined endogenously in the
manner of Section II(2)(a). A key distinction that immediately emerges as shaping
the distributional effects of the two taxes is then whether rich and poor differ more
in their expenditures on the taxed good or in the number of units they consume: if
rich and poor buy the same number of physical units, for example, but the rich
spend more on their variant, then an ad valorem tax will bear differentially on rich
and poor whereas a specific tax will be akin to a (regressive) poll tax. Indeed, so
long as the rich consume no fewer physical units than the poor, optimal policy in
this model involves a positive ad valorem tax — even when preferences are of the
full-price form — used in part to finance a specific subsidy:
34 in effect, the rich are
taxed in order to make a distributionally attractive poll subsidy. Seeing adverse
distributional consequences in unalloyed specific taxation, some developing
countries — such as India — have adopted tiered specific taxes, the rate
                                                                                                                             
33Vertical differentiation in the model of Cremer and Thisse (1994) discussed in Section II(2)(b), in contrast, is
driven by differences in strength of taste towards the differentiated good.
34There is an interesting similarity here with the result of Cremer and Thisse (1994) mentioned above, though these
two models of vertical differentiation are quite different.Fiscal Studies
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increasing (across bands) as the price increases: such a system has many
similarities, of course, with ad valorem taxation.
It is a limitation of the Kay–Keen model, however, that there is assumed to be
complete segmentation of the market between rich and poor. Myles (1988) shows
that when there is no such segmentation — but, on the other hand, the qualities of
two goods available are fixed — then the optimal tax structure can have counter-
intuitive features: in particular, it may be optimal to subsidise the high-quality
good. What underlies this surprising result is the observation — counter-intuitive,
but rather robust — that since the rich choose to consume the higher-quality good,
it must be the case that at some point the marginal utility of income must be higher
when consuming the higher-quality good than when consuming the low-quality
good. The explanation of this is rather involved,
35 but the implication is powerful
and immediate: the usual prescription of redistributing — all else being equal —
towards whichever group has the higher marginal utility of income means, in these
circumstances, redistributing towards the better-off. Myles’s analysis is not
motivated by, and so does not consider, the balance between ad valorem and
specific taxation; and indeed the possibility arises in these models that one might
wish to impose different specific and ad valorem taxes on each variant, instead of
applying a common tax structure to all. It seems clear that there are here
unresolved issues.
III. PRACTICE
In this section, we first consider empirical evidence on the relative effects of the
two taxes, and then we turn to administrative concerns.
1. Empirical Evidence
The theoretical analysis of the comparison between specific and ad valorem
taxation poses broadly two sets of tasks for empirical work. First, it suggests
testable hypotheses by which the theory might be evaluated. It suggests in
particular that, other things equal:
· predominantly ad valorem taxation tends to imply relatively low product
quality and relatively little product variety; and
· predominantly ad valorem taxation tends to imply a relatively low consumer
price: equivalently, specific tax increases are more likely to be ‘over-shifted’
than are ad valorem ones. This may result, recall, either (or both) from non-
                                                                                                                             
35Imagine two curves showing utility (on the vertical axis) as a function of income, one drawn on the assumption
that the low-quality good is consumed, the other assuming that it is the high-quality good which is consumed. If
those with low incomes prefer to consume the low-quality good while those on high incomes consume the high-
quality good, then the latter curve must somewhere cut the former from below, at which point it must have the
steeper slope (that is, the higher marginal utility of income).Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation
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competitive behaviour in the market for a homogeneous good or from tax-
induced variations in product quality.
Second, the theory points to some key quantities whose value one would ideally
wish to know when forming policy: we have seen, for example, that the optimal
balance between ad valorem and specific taxation is likely to depend on the price
elasticity of demand and, more exotically, on the price elasticity of the marginal
willingness to pay for additional quality.
Such evidence as there is on these matters is conveniently divided into two
types: econometric and case-study. We review these in turn and add a little to
both.
(a) Econometric Work
While there are now several empirical studies focused on the question of whether
commodity taxes are over-shifted,
36 there seem to be only three that recognise and
address the distinction between specific and ad valorem taxation: Barzel (1976),
its refinement by Johnson (1978), and Delipalla (1995).
These have a broadly common structure. None directly estimates quality
effects, suitable measures of quality being unavailable. Instead, they estimate a
reduced form in which the consumer price is regarded as a function of specific and
ad valorem tax rates (and perhaps also of other variables of no direct interest).
They explore the same broad question — whether the price effects of the two
kinds of tax differ in the way that theory predicts — on two different datasets,
both for cigarettes: Barzel and Johnson use a panel of US states for 1954–72;
Delipalla uses a quarterly panel of European Union member states for 1982–90.
The conclusions, too, are broadly similar: all three studies find the effects of
specific and ad valorem taxes to be significantly different, with the former leading
to larger price increases than the latter (and indeed tending to be over-shifted).
These are as the theory predicts, but the limitations of the underlying data are such
that the conclusions must be heavily qualified. The informativeness of the US
dataset is limited by the fact that, over the period studied, only one of the
continental US states levied an ad valorem tax.
37 The member states of the EU, in
contrast, are marked by a wide variation in the balance between specific and ad
valorem components in the taxation of cigarettes. But these national tobacco tax
structures show rather little variation over time — the exception being the
Netherlands, whose experience we analyse in some detail below — so that the
                                                                                                                             
36Sumner (1981) is an early example; more recent studies include Baker and Brechling (1992) and Besley and
Rosen (1994).
37It is reassuring that Johnson (1978) finds there to be a distinct tax effect even when controlling for state-specific
effects; less so that he notes (in footnote 7) that the effect of the ad valorem tax in Hawaii — omitted in Barzel
(1976) — runs counter to theory.Fiscal Studies
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panel is in effect little more than a small cross-section. Though suggestive, the
results from these studies are thus far from conclusive.
Note, too, that the methodology of these studies is such that they cannot
distinguish between the two possible reasons why specific and ad valorem taxes
might have distinct effects: quality adjustment and non-competitive behaviour.
This limitation is unfortunate, since the two have quite different policy
implications. If the difference reflects only imperfections of competition of the
kind in Section II(1), for instance, then one should rely mainly on ad valorem
taxation. What if it arises from quality variation? Delipalla (1995) shows that by
interpreting the reduced form as arising from a model of quality variation of the
kind in Section II(2)(a), one can infer an estimate of the elasticity of the marginal
willingness to pay for quality, upon which, as noted above, optimal policy then
hinges. But this estimate turns out not to be well determined, with estimates —
and hence the optimal ratio of ad valorem to total taxation implied by the rule at
the end of Section II(2)(a) — varying from 0.28 to 0.86.
(b) Case Studies
One of the principal obstacles to informative econometric work in this area is the
infrequency with which tax authorities undertake major changes in the balance
between specific and ad valorem taxation. Such structural shifts as do occur thus
acquire particular interest. We consider here two such reform episodes.
38
Tobacco Taxes in the Netherlands
One of the most spectacular shifts between specific and ad valorem taxation that
Europe has seen in recent years is in the taxation of tobacco products in the
Netherlands. At the start of the 1980s, the system was overwhelmingly ad
valorem: only about 10 per cent of the tax on cigarettes was specific, and roll-
your-own (RYO) — a cheap alternative to made cigarettes which has played a
particularly important role in the Netherlands — bore no specific tax at all. By the
end of the 1980s, however, the ratio of specific to total tax stood at the present
level of 50 per cent for both product groups. Though some increase in the specific
component was necessitated by the harmonisation measures in the European
Community mentioned in Section I, the Dutch government decided to adopt a
much heavier dose of specific taxation than it was formally obliged to. And its
primary motives in doing so, it seems, were to bolster revenues from tobacco taxes
and to increase their predictability. We focus here on the first of these objectives.
As can be seen from the numbers in Table 1, the shift towards specific taxation
came in two steps:
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· At the start of 1984, the ratios of specific to total taxation on both cigarettes
and RYO were raised from the very low levels just described to 25 per cent.
There was also a significant increase in the overall levels of taxation: by 13 per
cent for cigarettes and 28 per cent for RYO (both in real terms).
· At the start of 1987, the common ratio of specific to total tax was further
increased to 50 per cent, but this time the increase in specific taxation was
accompanied by a cut in the ad valorem component sufficient to leave total tax
almost unchanged: the real tax on the most popular price category (MPPC) of
cigarettes rose by 3 per cent, that on RYO by 4 per cent.
For the first of these episodes, it is of course difficult to disentangle the
consequences of the structural change from those of the increase in the level of
taxation. What does leap from Table 1(c) is a massive 22 per cent fall in tobacco
tax revenues in 1984. It is natural to suppose that this is very largely a reflection
of the sharp increase in the level of tobacco taxes. Notice, however, that not all of
the revenue change can reasonably be attributed to a simple contraction of demand
in the face of a large price increase: with tax being about 70 per cent of the
consumer price of cigarettes, a 13 per cent increase in tax will induce a 22 per cent
reduction of tax revenues only if
39 the price elasticity of demand is
                                                                                                                             
39Here we use the observation that perturbing revenue, R = TX(P), shows the proportional changes in revenue and
the tax rate, T, to be roughly (when dP = dT) dR/R = {1–(T/P)E}dT/T. The counterfactual is too simple, of course,
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1982 0.24 0.65 0.10 2.35 3.25 —
1983 0.25 0.65 0.10 2.45 3.38 —
1984 0.70 0.55 0.25 2.78 3.79 16,033
1985 0.69 0.54 0.25 2.75 3.82 16,468
1986 0.69 0.54 0.25 2.75 3.81 16,529
1987 1.41 0.36 0.50 2.83 3.94 16,184
1988 1.39 0.36 0.50 2.79 3.89 16,263
1989 1.37 0.35 0.51 2.71 3.84 16,345
1990 1.34 0.35 0.50 2.67 3.81 18,265
1991 1.31 0.35 0.50 2.64 3.79 18,388
1992 1.44 0.35 0.50 2.88 4.12 17,590
1993 1.61 0.36 0.50 3.23 4.49 16,116
1994 1.62 0.36 0.50 3.24 4.49 16,530
1995 1.63 0.36 0.50 3.26 4.53 17,150



















1982 0.00 0.52 0.00 33.9 65.43 —
1983 0.00 0.52 0.00 34.4 66.46 —
1984 11.05 0.42 0.25 44.1 78.86 18.3
1985 11.15 0.41 0.25 44.5 80.48 18.4
1986 11.14 0.41 0.25 44.5 80.40 18.3
1987 23.18 0.27 0.50 46.3 84.60 17.6
1988 22.89 0.27 0.50 45.7 83.61 17.2
1989 22.72 0.27 0.50 45.4 83.66 17.0
1990 22.07 0.26 0.50 44.2 84.17 17.8
1991 21.92 0.26 0.50 43.8 84.83 17.9
1992 29.09 0.28 0.50 57.9 100.88 16.2
1993 36.28 0.31 0.50 72.6 115.61 14.5
1994 36.11 0.31 0.50 72.2 116.36 15.2
1995 35.65 0.31 0.50 71.3 115.00 14.9
(c) Revenue from tobacco excises (million DFl)Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation
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1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
2,512 2,750 2,155 2,335 2,361 2,335 2,306 2,284 2,305 2,449 2,703 2,804 2,834 3,079
Note to Table 1: Figures are in 1995 prices; tax and price are time-weighted averages over the calendar year.
Sources of Table 1: Nominal data are taken from various issues of Sigaretten- en Kerftabakindustrie, Tabak;
conversion to real terms uses the GDP deflator from OECD Economic Outlook.
implausibly high, at around 3.8. It thus seems that the 1984 reform may have
coincided with some other shock to the demand for cigarettes (cross-border
shopping, for example, may have played a role): and it may be that the revenue
effects were exacerbated by some down-trading towards cheaper and less heavily
taxed products. In itself, however, the 1984 reform offers few clear lessons on the
impact of rebalancing specific and ad valorem components.
The 1987 reform, in contrast, is as pure an example of a structural shift as one
could imagine, so that one might hope it to be more informative on our present
concerns. The immediate effects were not dramatic. Revenue, which had recovered
somewhat in 1985, remained broadly stable in the late 1980s; but here, of course,
the general state of the economy is likely to have played a role. More fundamental,
one suspects, were some profound changes in market positions that took place
during the later 1980s, and which are naturally attributed, in large part, to the shift
towards specific taxation. The theory above suggests that this shift would favour
relatively high-quality products. There is, indeed, some evidence that more
expensive (and therefore, presumably, better-quality) brands of cigarette did gain
market share. Moreover, within the tobacco market widely defined, there was a
clear weakening in the position of RYO relative to cigarettes: between 1984 and
1991, sales of cigarettes rose by 15 per cent while sales of RYO fell by 2 per cent
(both measured by volume). Thus the shift towards specific taxation seems to have
brought about substantial upgrading from RYO to cigarettes.
In 1992, the Dutch government substantially increased the real levels of
taxation on both cigarettes and RYO — by 9 per cent and 32 per cent respectively
— whilst retaining the balance between specific and ad valorem components
unchanged. As is clear from Table 1(c), this was followed by a substantial
increase in tax revenues. The contrast between this and the marked loss of revenue
after the 1984 reform is striking. Though clearly not a complete explanation of
these very different experiences, it seems likely that an important part of the story
is the effect of heavier specific taxation in eroding the role of RYOs as a cheap
alternative to cigarettes.
For a more satisfying interpretation of the Dutch experience, one naturally
looks to econometric analysis. Data limitations and the relatively short time period
involved severely restrict the possibilities. While the results must therefore be read
with some care, two simple regressions — developed and reported in Appendix B
— are of particular interest as tending to confirm that specific and ad valorem
taxes have indeed had identifiably distinct effects in the Netherlands and,Fiscal Studies
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moreover, that the pattern of effects is consistent with the occurrence of upgrading
in the Dutch cigarette market. One set of results indicates that specific and ad
valorem taxes have significantly different effects on the consumer price, which —
as theory predicts — tends to rise more with specific taxation than with ad
valorem. The second suggests that, conditional on the price of the MPPC, the total
volume of cigarettes consumed tends to be lower the greater is the ratio of specific
to total tax; which is as one would expect if consumers tend to react to a shift
towards specific taxation by smoking fewer but better cigarettes.
Alcoholic Drink in Sweden
In 1992, the Swedish government fundamentally reformed its tax treatment of
alcoholic drinks. This reform comprised two components. One was the complete
elimination of ad valorem taxation (other than VAT), which had previously been
very substantial: 60 per cent, for example, on spirits. The second was a
reformulation of the specific taxes, which had previously been independent of
alcohol content within the broad categories of drink: taxation was henceforth to be
more closely related to alcohol content, which was to be taxed at broadly the same
rate both within and across categories of drink.
In contrast to the Dutch tobacco tax reform, the objective of the Swedish
reform was not to increase tax revenues. In part, the objective was to comply with
requirements for membership of the EU, as described in Section I.
40 More
fundamentally, however, the reform was introduced with the deliberate purpose of
reducing alcohol consumption. Though revenue was not to be jeopardised — so
that the reform was designed to be broadly revenue-neutral — the motivation was
thus closer to a concern with externalities of the kind discussed in Section II(4).
The elimination of the ad valorem tax obviously tends to favour higher-priced
drinks, while the shift towards specific taxation by alcohol content clearly favours
relatively less alcoholic drinks. Thus one would expect the reform to lead to
increased sales of high-quality drinks of relatively low alcohol content. That,
indeed, is exactly what was observed, and the effect, moreover, was very
significant. In the market for spirits, for example, Swedish vodka — a relatively
cheap, high-alcohol drink — experienced a price increase of 6 per cent between
1991 and 1992, over which time sales (in litres) fell by 17 per cent. Bells’ whisky,
on the other hand — a less alcoholic but more expensive drink — fell in price by 7
per cent and increased sales by 10 per cent. Similarly large shifts towards
expensive less alcoholic drinks were experienced in the wine and fortified wine
sectors.
It is an immediate implication of the discussion in Section II(4) — indeed,
simple common sense — that in so far as the object of policy was to reduce
alcohol consumption, shifting towards a specific tax related to alcohol content was
                                                                                                                             
40EU requirements led to further reforms in 1995 and 1997, but these are of no special interest for our present
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a wise strategy. Per capita consumption of pure alcohol in Sweden, which had
been broadly stable or increasing since the mid-1980s, did indeed fall slightly
between 1991 and 1995, by a little under 2 per cent,
41 though it is unclear how
significant this is in the context of what seems to be a secular decline.
2. Administrative Issues
Two main sets of administrative issues arise in considering the appropriate
balance between the two taxes.
(a) Inflation Adjustment
The choice between ad valorem and specific taxes has often been heavily swayed,
in practice, by the observation that whilst the amount of ad valorem tax payable
on a unit of the product increases in proportion to its price and so rises
automatically in line with general inflation, such inflation erodes the real value of
a specific tax fixed in nominal terms.
Quite why this point should have received as much weight as it evidently has is
by no means clear. For there would seem an obvious way to avoid these
difficulties: simply index the specific component, with uprating at whatever
frequency is felt necessary to track inflation. In practice, however, governments
appear for some reason reluctant to follow this course: only Sweden automatically
indexes specific taxes. And there is indeed a real difference between the smooth
adjustment of an ad valorem tax and the discontinuous adjustment of an indexed
specific tax: in a general inflation, with the prices of all goods — including the one
being taxed — rising at the same rate, an ad valorem tax leaves relative prices
unchanged over time whereas relative prices do change under a periodically
indexed specific tax, with that of the taxed good jumping upwards at the time of
uprating. Such movements in the relative price do imply real welfare losses and
damage tax revenue, since they encourage consumers to shift purchases from
periods after uprating to periods just before. There is thus reason to suppose that
political resistance to indexed specific taxes will be greater than resistance to ad
valorem taxes, though this effect should be weaker the more frequent are the
adjustments. But even this problem of infrequent adjustment can be overcome: the
specific component might be specified in terms of some hard foreign currency.
This strategy has been adopted by some transition economies, including Romania
and Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, it seems clear that inflation adjustment will remain
a major concern of practitioners.
                                                                                                                             




There is an inherent difference between the kind of monitoring by the authorities
that is required to implement the two kinds of tax: a specific tax requires
monitoring the volume of sales; ad valorem taxation requires monitoring the
value. In many contexts, this may have little significance for the choice between
them: systems of fiscal markers, for instance, can be and are applied to both kinds
of tax.
There are two sets of circumstances, however, in which the relative ease of
monitoring may affect the appropriate tax structure. One is that in which the
technology is such that — even when taxpayers are honest — one attribute is
significantly cheaper to monitor than the other. It was partly in order to avoid the
need for landfill sites to acquire weighbridges, for example, that HM Customs and
Excise initially favoured an ad valorem form for the landfill tax. Such costs may,
of course, sometimes be mitigated by reconsidering the way in which a unit of the
commodity is defined for purposes of specific taxation. In the UK, for example,
the specific tax on beer was formerly based on the wort — the liquid before
fermentation — which required an arbitrary allowance to be made for wastage;
now it is assessed on the final product. Ultimately, the question is whether the
characteristics that one can conveniently tax are close enough to those that one
wishes to tax.
The second and perhaps most fundamental case in which monitoring
differences may matter is that in which taxpayers are dishonest, and find it easier
to misrepresent volume rather than value, or vice versa. This has been a particular
concern in several transitional economies, where the supply of heavily excised
goods is largely by import. Border controls then have a crucial role in bringing
these goods into tax. In the context of cigarettes, for example, such checks have
proved vulnerable to false invoicing, understating the true value of goods imported
and so liable to any ad valorem tax. Especially when systems of record-keeping
are rudimentary, physical volume may be easier to check, and specific taxation to
that extent preferable.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Three broad conclusions merit some emphasis. The first, and perhaps most
important, is simply that the balance between specific and ad valorem taxation
can matter a very great deal for the interests of consumers, producers and
government. Second, theory suggests, and experience generally confirms, that
predominantly specific taxation tends to lead to relatively high levels of price,
product quality and variety. The third is that there are no unambiguous
conclusions as to the optimal balance between the two taxes, which proves quite
sensitive to the particular characteristics of the market at issue. There are
examples in which wholly ad valorem taxation is optimal, and there are others inSpecific and Ad Valorem Taxation
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which wholly specific taxation is optimal. In the very broadest terms, however,
predominantly ad valorem taxation seems most likely to be attractive — in terms
of both consumer welfare and the amount of tax revenue raised — in markets
characterised by marked monopolistic output restrictions and little actual or
potential heterogeneity of the product. Specific taxation, on the other hand, seems
most likely to be appropriate when the preservation of product quality is a
particular concern and/or some negative externality associated with consumption
of the good can be conveniently linked to one of its measurable characteristics,
which is then an appropriate basis for taxation. Clearly, then, there is no general
prescription as to the appropriate balance between the two taxes, which indeed is
likely to differ quite markedly over distinct contexts. Theory points us towards
some quantities that one would ideally wish to know in order to decide an
appropriate tax structure — such as the price elasticity of the marginal willingness
to pay for quality — but their reasonably precise measurement remains some way
from practicability in most applications, not least because of the difficulties, both
conceptual and practical, of measuring product quality. The models of imperfect
competition used in the literature are also, in important respects, special cases. But
while there thus remains much to be done — in, for example, exploring richer
models of vertical differentiation and examining empirically the impact of tax
structure on product quality and variety — there exists a rich body of theory and
experience from which to draw some potentially powerful insights.
APPENDIX A: THE OPTIMAL BALANCE BETWEEN SPECIFIC AND
AD VALOREM TAXATION UNDER MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
The purpose here is to explore, briefly, the optimal balance between ad valorem
and specific taxation in the model of monopolistic competition in (Section 1 of)
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
There is a single representative consumer with homothetic preferences
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(lump-sum income — constant throughout the analysis — having been normalised
to unity), where P is the common consumer price and P* a price index equal, in
symmetric equilibrium, to  P N
b - . Welfare depends only on P*, in which it is
strictly decreasing: thus the value placed on diversity is greater the larger
42 is  b .
Each firm produces just one variant, choosing its output level to maximise profits,
{(1–v)Pi – s – c}xi – F (where c denotes marginal cost, assumed constant, and F >
0 denotes fixed costs), taking P* as given when doing so. This implies
(A.3) .
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The number of variants available in equilibrium is then tied down by equation
(A.3) and a free entry condition: the details need not concern us. Using the zero
profit condition, the second-order condition of the typical firm’s problem is readily
shown to imply v < 1 at an optimum.
Consider then the Ramsey problem in this model: that of choosing v and s to
maximise welfare subject to raising some prescribed amount of tax revenue, R. It
so happens that there is no purely corrective role for taxation in this model, so that
v and s are both optimally set to zero if R = 0: this follows from the result of Dixit
and Stiglitz that the no-tax equilibrium is constrained efficient, in the sense that it
is impossible to do any better so long as one is unable to make lump-sum transfers
to firms. For the case in which R > 0:
PROPOSITION: The optimal ad valorem tax is strictly positive. The optimal
specific tax is negative (respectively: zero; strictly positive) if and only if b  > 1
(iff b  = 1; iff b  < 1).
Proof: Since welfare depends only on  P N b -  and (from the zero profit condition)
the revenue requirement  R nx s vP ³ + ) (  is equivalent to  R n F x c p ³ - - } ) {( ,
equation (A.2) implies that the problem reduces to that of choosing N and P to
minimise  P N b -  subject to
(A.4) .
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substitution between any two variants: the lower is  , b  the easier it is to substitute between them and, in that sense,
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Multiplying the necessary condition on the choice of P by   and adding the
result to the necessary condition on N, some rearrangement, using again the
revenue constraint, gives
(A.5)
To see that v > 0 at an optimum, note first that combining equation (A.5) with
equation (A.3) gives
(A.6) ,
so that v < 0 would imply
(A.7)
where the first inequality reflects the implication of R > 0 that P > c, the equality
uses equation (A.6), and the final conclusion that vP+s < 0 implies strictly
negative tax revenue, a contradiction.
Turning to the optimal specific tax, consider the three possibilities:
1.     >   1: From equation (A.3), P > 0 implies that c+s > 0; which, from
equation (A.6), implies   > 0; having just seen that v > 0, the conclusion
that s > 0 follows from equation (A.6).
2.     =   1: That s = 0 in this case is immediate from equation (A.6).
3.     <   1: Again recalling that v > 0, the conclusion that s < 0 is again
immediate from equation (A.6).
APPENDIX B: THE TAXATION OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS IN THE
NETHERLANDS: FURTHER ANALYSIS
A natural and key first question to ask is whether the distinction between specific
and ad valorem taxation is of any significance in explaining developments in the
Dutch market for tobacco products or whether, on the contrary, the market
behaves ‘as if’ it were a perfectly competitive one in which the two taxes are
exactly equivalent. In such a market, the equilibrium price would be determined byFiscal Studies
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the market-clearing condition X(P) = S((1–v)P – s), where S(.) denotes the market
supply curve. Perturbing this, one finds
(B.1)
where   > 0 denotes the elasticity of supply and  .
Thus one might test for equivalence by regressing the change in the (real)
consumer price of cigarettes, Pcig, against Pcigdv/(1–v) and ds/(1–v) and checking




2 = 0.89; DW = 2.08,
the figures in parentheses below the coefficients being t-ratios. At around unity,
the coefficients in equation (B.2) are of broadly the magnitude one would expect.
On the issue of central interest, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of identical
coefficients at 3 per cent. The two types of tax thus have significantly different
effects, with specific taxation tending to increase price more than ad valorem
taxation; this is again as theory predicts, though of course the result might be due
to either (or both) departures from competitive price-setting or quality upgrading.
In the absence of detailed market share information, one might look for
evidence of upgrading by asking whether the ratio of specific to total taxation has
any independent impact on the total number of cigarettes smoked (over and above
any impact it has via the general price level for cigarettes): intuitively, as that ratio
rises, so one might expect individuals to respond — for the reasons set out at the
start of Section II — by consuming smaller amounts of higher-quality variants.
Controlling for the general level of activity by the inclusion of aggregate
consumption,
43 Xagg, including a linear time trend, TIME, and instrumenting the
potentially endogenous Pcig (by the contemporaneous tax rates v and s),
44 one
finds:
                                                                                                                             
43Data for which are taken from IMF Financial Statistics.




2 = 0.88; Sargan, 
2(1) = 3.71 (0.05).
The signs and magnitudes appear broadly sensible, though the price elasticity
seems rather high and the effect from aggregate consumption surprisingly strong.
There is no immediate evidence of first-order serial correlation.
45 While the result
in equation (B.3) must thus be interpreted with caution, taken in that spirit the
significantly negative effect of the ratio of specific to total taxation provides some
very tentative sign of upgrading at work: switching from ad valorem to specific
taxation whilst holding the price of cigarettes broadly constant significantly
reduces the volume of cigarette consumption.
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